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UNIFORMITY IN THE MARITIME LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES. (I)
RECOGNITION OF THE DOCTRINE: THE EARLY PERIOD.
In one form or another, from a time long antedating Lord
Coke, the question has been argued whether maritime trans-
actions should be governed by a law all their own, and, if so,
how far such "particularism" should go.' Meanwhile, from a
date quite as early, admiralty law has remained particularistic
in most if not in all civilized countries, though in varying degree
from time to time and place to place. But of course the fact that
it has for so long had this quality is no reason why the situation
should continue, and if there is no real basis for it in modem
conditions, the silver oar should be taken down,2 and the common
law, enlightened by the statutes of today, should finally triumph
as Lord Coke and Justice Daniel once hoped it would.
This question is not one which a lawyer alone should at-
tempt to answer-it is quite as much of fact as of law; and
neither should an economist. Together, lowever, they might
1 M. Julien B6nnecase, TraitE de Droit Commercial Maritime, Paris,
r922, has most interestingly discussed the justification for particularism in the
French maritime law, and has come to a generally adverse conclusio. But
see the review of this book by Georges Ripert, 2 REVUE m DR= MAzTius
ComP t 783.
' 23 LAW MAC. AND RmnEw, ( 4 th series) 5; 2 id. 29&
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accomplish something. The field (if anything maritime may
be so called) is vast.. The whole subject of business, labor, and
pleasure by sea and upon navigable waters should be investi-
gated, with special attention to the waterfront and uptown at
least as far as the offices and haunts of shipowners, importers,
exporters, ship chandlers, ship and cargo brokers and surveyors;
underwriters, shipbuilders and repairmen, boss stevedores, seamen,
longshoremen, shipyard. workers, and bankers doing a marine
business. The lawyer and economist should direct this investiga-
tion and work upon its results, together. But until they both have
learned better to marry their energies, this question, like many
others, will. 'remain unsolved, and the lawyer will go his way
guessing at facts and framing rules to apply to situations that
are often quite different from what he conceives them to be;
and the economist his, more familiar perhaps with .actualities as
a whole, but formulating impracticable or draconic laws to gov-
ern them. Though nothing final can be doneuntil this marriage
takes place, the lawyer as an analyst of current theories and
conceptions, can at least furnish hypotheses which some day
may serve to guide future investigators. In these articles my
purpose is to set forth such an hypothesis, aimed towards answer-
ing the question above given, and more particularly to show it
to be a worthy basis for investigation, and then to suggest lines
of approach for determining how far our existing maritime law
comports with this hypothesis. For the present, however, merely
the hypothesis and its prina faeie justification will be submitted.
The hypothesis or theory is uniformity,-that our admi-
ralty law as a whole finds its justification for particularism in the
desirability of a uniform law applicable to maritime enterprises
and transactions, not only so far as they involve contacts be-
tween foreigners and citzens of the United States and between
such citizens, whether of the same or of different states, but also
so far as they involve contacts of a maritime nature throughout
the civilized world. If this theory has been and is now to any
considerable extent engrafted in the law of the United States,
or even if it has merely been sanctioned by a strong current of
legal opinion, I submit that it furnishes an hypothesis worthy of
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consideration and investigation,-in other words, that it is prima
facie justified.
The theory has, of course, recently been announced by a
majority of the Supreme Court in such terms as to leave no
doubt that they believe it to be a fundamental doctrine of our
maritime law.3 If it had not also been vigorously attacked-
though perhaps rather as a principle of our law than as a de-
sirable theory-one could accept the decisions of the Supreme
Court as at least prima facie establishing its worthiness for con-
sideration and investigation; but the array of opinion against it
is so formidable 4 that it is, so to speak, put upon the defensive.
In this connection it may not be wholly unfitting to observe that
although the decisions announcing the theory are possibly unfor-
tunate in result, this is not necessarily the fault of the theory.
Uniformity of our maritime lav was only their major premise.
The minor premise is very likely an erroneous one. It may be
good advocacy, but certainly it is not always sound political sense
to seek to destroy indiscriminately every premise that has led
to an undesirable conclusion. The premise of uniformity may
have much- to commend it in other applications. Injuries to work-
men are not all of maritime law.
However this may be, let us consider how far the theory
may be said to be engrafted in our law and in maritime law in
general, apart from these cases. Is it a modern development or
"Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917); Chelentis v.
Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372 (igi8); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stew-
art, 253 U. S. 149 (92o); Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U. S.
469 (922); State Industrial Com. of N. Y. v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S.
263 (1922); State of Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219 (1924); Cf , Pan-
ama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1924).
'For example: Holmes, J., dissenting in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
and in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra, note 3; Pitney, J., dissenting
in the former case.
F. Cunningham, Is Every County Court in the U. S. g Court of Admir-
alty? 53 Am. L. REv. 749, 5 MAss. L QUAIL 74; and The Tables Turned-
Lord Coke Demolished, s5 Am. L. Rnv. 685; Edward Tremlett Fell Recent
Problems in Admiralty Jurisdiction. 40 JoHns HoPKiNs Uxiv. STUDIES 287,
3o3; E. Merrck Dodd, Jr., The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Ad-
m.ralty-over Common Law. 21 .COL. L REV. 647. See also J. G. Palfrey,
Common Law Courts and the Law of the Sea, 36 HAzv. L. REv. 777, 33
HARV. L. REV. 300, 37 HARV. L. REv. itz4. For list of further comments; on
these cases see Washington v. Dawson, z924 Am. Mar. Cas. at 416 n. i8, 417 11.
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has it had a longer history than the past eight years? Is it a
local theory or a general one? These are historical questions,
of course, and for complete discussion require years of research
and volumes of print. All that can be done here is briefly to sur-
vey a very large subject.
The beginnings of admiralty and maritime law as we know
it today are to be found in the Middle Ages, and from the start,
to speak generally, such law has been international in nature.
Traders and merchants of that time, in varying degrees perhaps
from place to place and century to century, had a body of cus-
toms or laws which governed them in their transactions wher-
ever they might go, with their own special courts to give these
customs or laws legal effect.5 Among these courts were those
that pertained to the maritime affairs of these men, and the
particularistic law applied therein was the maritime law, a part
of the law merchant.6 The laws of Oleron spread over the
Atlantic and Baltic seaboards; 7 the Consolato del Mare over
large parts of the Christian Mediterranean; 1 the Ordonnatwe of
Louis XIV of .68i, which brought into one code much of Oleron
and of the Consolato, was adopted all over Europe.;I and later
the Code de Commerce, in its .maritime portions based largely on
the Ordonnance, had an even wider extension.1 0 .
'Cf. Huevlin, Essai Historique sur le Droit des Marchis et des Foires;
A. T. Carter, The Early History of the Law Merchant in England, if LAw.
QuAR. REv. 232; I Select Cases on the Law Merchant (23 Selden Soc.) In-
troduction; Nouvelle Revue Historique de Droit, i8gi, 36, 193, 446. "And
for that the said customary Law of Merchants, hath a peculiar prerogative
above all other Customes, for that the same is observed in all places, whereas
the Customes of one place, do not extend in other places, and sometimes they
are observed, and sometimes they are neglected. But the Customes of Mer-
chants concerning trafficke are permanent and constant " Gerald
Malynes, Lex Mercatoria (z622).
Cf, Sir Travers Twiss, 2 LAw. MAG. & Ray., (4th series) 279, 2 Black
Book xxv, lxvi; W. S. Holdsworth, The Development of the law Mer-
chant and Its Courts, 2 Select Essays" in Anglo-American Legal History, 289;
i Danjon, Droit Maritime, secs. 1-12; 1 Blackstone 273.
'Cf. i Danjon, Droit Maritime, sec. 3; 1 Black Book, lxvii, 448; 1 Par-
dessus, Lois Maritimes, 283.
"Cf. Danjon, loc. cit.
'Danjon, sec. 5; and see Preface to Valin's Commentaries (Becane's ed.
1840) Viiin
W Danjon, secs. 6-8.
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Though in various countries, as they became increasingly
nationalistic, the special courts for merchants by land or by sea
tended to disappear, the admiralty court, despite various vicissi-
tudes, usually survived, and at all events the law merchant was
not lost. In England the well-known three-cornered battle for
jurisdiction between the local commercial courts, the admiralty,
and the common law courts resulted in the loss of their power
by the first named, but the admiralty, which in the early period
took over much of their jurisdiction, seems to have applied as
they had done an international maritime law.11
This, then, was the situation at the time our country was
being settled: there was a body of sea law, more or less incom-
plete and imperfect, no doubt, and with variations from place
to place, but prevailing generally -throughout the civilized mari-
time world, more striking in its similarities than in its local
differences, and at all events much more uniform than the purely
local, law of the countries enforcing it. The international char-
acter of what may be broadly called the shipping man, of his
enterprises, and of his customs, was surely the strongest factor
in producing and continuing this uniformity. The maritime law
reflected the conditions of trade by sea. They were interna-
tional and so was it. Maritime trade established contacts be-
tween men of different nations, and maritime custom or law, fol-
lowing the trader,. brought about like legal consequences from
these contacts wherever he might go and into whatever com-
mercial court he might be drawn, willingly or unwillingly. The
Cf. A. T. Carter, The Early History of the Law Merchant, 17 L. QUA.
REv. 232; R. S. Marsden, i Select Pleas Admiralty (6 Selden Soc.) Intro-
duction, and particularly xiii, xliv, 2 Select Fleas Admiralty (ix Selden Soc.)
Introduction and particularly xix; 4 Pardessus, Lois Mar. 197; IV. Senior,
Admiralty Matters in the isth Century, 35 L.. QuA. REv. 2_0.
See for interesting instance, i S. P. A. 78, 203. The conflict between
the admiralty and the common law is too well known to require citation be-
"yond De Lovio v. Boit, 2 GalL 398 (U. S. C. C. x8i5) and Benedict, Ad-
miralty, 5th ed.
For the sources of the maritime law of England during this period, see
x S. P. A. 82; 2 S. P. A. xliii, 122; x Black Book xxxii, lx, lxiX, 255; 2
Browne, C"iv. Law & Adm. 21o; Zouch, Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of Eng-
land Asserted, ed. 1663, 1o, ii; Roscoe, Adm. Prac, 4th ed. 31; De Lovio v.
Boit, 401; i. Black Book 448.
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operative field of maritime law being thus in fact international,
men of this time, less concerned than we are today with doc-
trines of sovereignty and sanction, regarded-the maritime law as
a part of the jis gentium.'
2
When our Constitution was being drafted, this conception of
maritime law was certainly very widely adopted, but whether or
not it was that of the framers is at present only a matter of
inference, for remarkably little was said by them on the subject
of admiralty and maritime law and jurisdiction. The grant
thereof to the Federal tribunals appears in their first draft and re-
mains unchanged to the end. There was hardly any debate upon
it, and when such debate occurred the argument made was sub-
stantially that of Hamilton in the Federalist, later referred: to.'
8
When the framers went forth to justify the Constitution to the
states, again little was said, for apparently it was taken for granted
that if the Federal courts were to have any jurisdiction at all,
they should have jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime mat-
ters. 4  The nature of admiralty and maritime law seems no-
where to have been discussed, although a deeper examination
of contemporary opinion than I have made would no doubt
* bring more to light. On the other hand we do find Madison and
""The maritime law is not the law of a particular country, but the gen-
eral law of nations." Lord Mansfield, C. J., in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 887
(1759). "A tribunal similar to the district courts of the United States ex-
ists in every civilized coiitr_', peculiarly invested with the cognizance of all
questions which result from the navigation of the sea, in which foreigners are
or may be interested, and which are governed by the law of nations." Win-
chester, I., Stevens v. Sandwich, z Pet. Adm. Dec. 233 (Dist. Ct., 1799-I8o6) ;
De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall 398, 472. Story, I.; W. S. Holdsworth, The Law
Merchant, i Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, 289 327 33o;
F. M. Burdick, What is a Law Merchant? 2 CoL L Rzv. 470, 3 Select ssays
34, 45; 4 Blackstone 67. For later echoes of this theory, too numerous to
mention in full, see The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 187 (1871) ; New Jersey Steam
Nay. Co. v. Merchants Bk., 6 How. 344 (1848). The overriding of a par-
ticular law, otherwise applicable, by the "general maritime law" illustrates
the same principle: The Avon. Brown Adm. 170 (C. Ct. 1873); The Kongsli,
252 Fed. 267 (D. C. 1918) ; on which see 26 HAtv. L, Rnv. 356; The Wind-
rush, 286 Fed. z5i (D. C. 1922).
"25 Elliott's Debates, ed. i845, 159.
'2 Elliott's Debates 490; 4 id. i59.
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Randolph in Virginia relating the grant of jurisdiction to the
desirability of uniformity. 5
Unless there was a commonly accepted opinion as to what
the term "admiralty and maritime" included, the silence of the
framers is difficult to explain. The only matter they discuss
is the desirability of vesting jurisdiction over this "something"
in the Federal courts. It seems probable, therefore, that this
something had a generally understood meaning. The most likely
meaning is that which we have seen was widely held at the
time, and which certainly comports with what Madison said in
Virginia, and with all else on the subject in Elliott's Debates.
As to the Judiciary Act of 1789,1' which it is customary to re-
gard as containing a contemporaneous interpretation of the Con-
stitution,17 that act, so far as the grant of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction is concerned, is at most merely some evidence of the
framers' attitude towards the concurrency of state jurisdiction. It
is evidence of nothing more, and whether it is even that is at least
doubtful, for, as Mr. Charles Warren has recently pointed out,18
the Judiciary Act was a compromise measure and may have ex-
pressed less or more than the framers intended. Contempora-
neous or nearly contemporaneous judicial opinion seems to throw
more light upon the framers' meaning, and in the decisions of
the early Federal admiralty judges we find at least a tendency
3s3 Elliott's Debates 532, Madison: "If, in any case, uniformity is nec-
essary, it must be in the exposition of treaties. The establishment of one
revisionary superintending power can alone secure such uniformity. To the
same principle may also be referred their cognizance in admiralty and mari-
time cases. As our intercourse with foreign nations will be affected'by de-
cisions of this land, they ought to be uniform." See also, id. 571, Randolph.
2' Laws of U. S., Act Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, sec. 9, p. 47: 
" . . the dis-
trict courts . . . shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all
cases the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is compe-
tent to give it." See also Fed. Code, secs. 24, 256, as amended.
'Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 1:21 U. S. 265, 297 (1888); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. at 225 (1917), Pitney, J., dissenting. See asc
E. T. Fell. 40 Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies 292; J. G. Palfrey, 36 HAv. L
REV. 777, 784.
' 1 3 ew Light on the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HAy. L.
REV. 49, 53.
130 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
to regard the law they were applying as much more than merely
local. 1'
Let it be conceded that there never was a general maritime
law in the sense of a supernational law controlling the courts of
a nation in their decisions; let it even be conceded that such
principles as were commonly accepted were in no true sense part
of the jus gentfiom, yet these facts remain: there were principles
of common international acceptance in maritime matters; there
were codes of maritime laws enacted by nation after nation with
but slight changes or followed and approved without enactment;
there were commentators upon maritime law and upon these
codes who were honored outside their own countries; and, even
of more significance, our early admiralty judges, over and over
"Our early judges sought to find the common law in English and local
precedents with a strong preference for the decided case. The early district
and circuit judges (1792-z8io) sitting in admiralty cases proceeded differently.
The following, by no means complete, shows to some extent what they looked
to in determining questions of maritime law. Instances where common law
abridgments and cases are cited-nearly always merely for what they con-
tain of the maritime law-are not included. Such authorities are also, gen-
erally speaking, in the minority.
Bee, D. J., Dist. of S. C., cites few authorities for his decisions 1792-1808,
except those of Judge Hopkinson in the Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania.
Of general maritime authorities he cites Beawes, Lex Merc. (Bee, at 149, 154,
206); Molloy (id., at 117, 238); Oleron (id., at ii8); Hanse Towns (id., at
155, 255); Valin (id., at 255).
Davis, D. J., Dist. of Mass., cites in a single case, xi.o, wisby, Oleron,
Hanse Towns. Ordonnance of i68z, Consolato del Mare, Cleirac, Valin, Kuricke,
Pothier, Godolphin, Molloy (Bee, 44x, ff.).
Peters, D. J., Dist. of Penn., in cases involving salvage, seaman s rights
and liabilities, disputes among part owners, and forfeiture (1792-i8o6), relies
upon Oleron (Pet. Adm. Dec., at 54, 117, 119, 142ff, 162 172, 204, 270, 425).;
Beawes, Lex. Merc. (id., at 2q7, 29o); Malynes, Lex. Mere., Valin, Emen-
gon, Curia Phillipica (id., at i19);'Consolato del Mare (id. at 119, 171);
Digest (id., at 119, 145) ; Wisby (id., 144 16z, 172, 253); Hanse Towns (id.,
at 144) ; Molloy (id., at 410, 425) ; Pothier (id., at 136) ; Ord. i681 (id., at
292, 417); Zouch (id., at 470).
Washington, C. J., Cir. Ct. Dist. Penn. (x8o6), Oleron (Pet. Adm. Dec.
at 158).
Winchester, D. J., Dist. of Md., bef. i8o6, Emerigon (Pet Adm. Dec.
392) ; Casaregis (id., at 234); Zouch (id, at 235); Beawes, Lex. Merc. (id.,
at 235, 303) ; Maline (sic.) (id., at i92-). The following citations cover cases
where before the revolution admiralty judges relied upon what might be
characterized as international maritime autho-ity, Hopkinson, J., Bee 339 (Ad
miralty Court of Pa.), Bottomry; Molloy; Bee 348, same, Molloy and com-
mon law prohibition cases; Bee 353, hypothecation, Molloy; Bee 419, ship-
wright's right to sue, common law authorities; Drayton, J., Admiralty Court
of South Carolina, Bee 433 (1786), shipwright's lien, Molloy and common law
authorites.
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again adhered to this same tradition of internationality, applied
these principles, followed these codes, and adopted as applicable
to their problems the theories of these commentators. There
might be a difference of opinion as to how far we were to follow
England, but of the early judges the one who most flatly declared
that we had taken over English admiralty law, most frequently
relied upon these international authorities. 20 This attitude con-
tinued far into the nineteenth century and was particularly that
of Justice Story.21 It has never wholly ceased to exist, in spite
of many applications of the principle of stare decisis which well
might have less operative force as to commercial maritime law
than as to local common law matters,---a principle taken over.
from the common law by judges trained therein without appar-
ent realization of its localizing consequences, and in this respect
perhaps the greatest of all the enemies of the international uni-
formity of maritime law.
22
Be that as it may, much uniformity of law in fact existed,
and a conception of maritime law resulting to a large extent in
uniformity was prevalent, when the Constitution was adopted.
But before the place of the doctrine of uniformity in our law
after this time is considered, attention should be called to Hamil-
ton's argument for the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion to theFederal judiciary. In theFederalist he'says: "The most
bigoted idolizers of State Authority have not thus far shown a
disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizances of mari-
time causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations,
and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall.
within the considerations which are relative to the public peace."
The considerations to which he refers, set forth in an earlier part
of the paper, are, in brief, "that the peace of the WHOLE ought
"Peters, D. J. See i Pet. Adm. Dec. 22 and m. i9.
'See for Story, J., e. g., Emerson v. Howland, i Mason C. C. 45 (816);
De Lovio v. Boit, supra, note i. Ware, D. J., i Ware 187 (1831), i Ware
265 (1834). For instances.of the classical method in more recent cases, see
Brown, D. J., A Raft of Cypress Logs, i Flip. 543 (Dist. Ct., W. D. Tenn.
1876); Holmes, J., The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361 (i9o4); Hough, C. I., The
Saturnus, 250 Fed. 407 (C. C. A. 1918).
'Cf. W. S. Holdsworth, i Select Essays 32o.
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not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will un-
doubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members, ., ." for which reasons, he states, Federal courts
have jurisdiction over disputes involving foreigners, and between
citizens of different states. 28
Whether this was advocacy.aimed merely to counteract a
particular popular fear or was intended to express the whole rea-
son for the grant of jurisdiction.is by no means clear. If the
latter were true.and were given effect as a contemporaneous in-
terpretation of the Constitution, the maritime law developed in
this country: might have taken a somewhat different course.
Jurisdiction might well have depended solely upon the question
whether or not a foreigner was involved in a maritime transac-
tion with a citizen. The diversity clause would be sufficient to
take care of cases between citizens of different states. On the
other hand such jurisdiction ought necessarily to be altogether
exclusive of -the state courts, and if not,--even .if Congress had
still passed the Judiciary Act and if its saving clause were held
.constitutional,-the states in.exercising concurrent jurisdiction
should be bound to apply Federal maritime law, and should'be
subject to review thereon by the Supreme-Court. In short, such
a reason, so far as foreigneis are concerned, clearly justifies the
major premise of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, and
is.predicated upon an ideal.of uniformity with regard to a par-
ticular sort of maritime contact.
With hesitation, however, I suggest that this statement of
Hamilton's does not express the whole -reason -why admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction was vested in the Federal courts. If
the conception of maritime ,law at the time of the Constitution
was as stated, it -would seem to follow that the framers intended
that the new Federal courts should have jurisdiction to apply,
and should apply, the international maritime law, the law of the
sea, to all cases within its scope without special regard to whether
the maritime contact -involved was between domestic persons, per-
sons of different states, foreigners and domestic persons, or even
MThe Federalist, LXXX. For similar arguments, see 3 Elliott's De-
bates 532, 571.
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foreigners. 24 At any rate we find in early decisions no thought
of limiting jurisdiction as it might well have been limited if
,Hamilton's argument had been the sole reason for the grant.2
JInstead we: find the early Federal judges carrying on a tradition
with no apparent consciousness that they as admiralty judges
were saving the nation. On the other hand, Hamilton may well
have stated, if not the sole, at least one reason for the grant of
jurisdiction. If so, only the limitation implicit in his statement
need go; 26 the rest remains, that is, the necessary domination of
the state law by the Federal maritime law, at least with regard
to cases involving foreigners. Furthermore, Hamilton seem-
ingly refers to disputes between citizens of different states as
included within the grant of jurisdiction, and it is unlikely that
be contemplated a maritime law for them different from what it
was for foreigners. The tacit premise of his reasoning is uni-
formity; such was the expressed premise of Madison's argu-
ment-in Virginia; and such. a premise is at least latent in the atti-
tude of i.any of our early admiralty judges towards the mari-
-time law. This premise, tacitor express, is of course ill developed
as to all its applications. Nevertheless, can anyone confidently
assert that the framers of the Constitution did not intend that
the law to be applied to persons engaged in maritime transactions
should be uniform whether in the Federal admiralty or in the
state courts? It is of course true that in England 27 and to some
" Pet. Adm. Dec. 46 n. (D. C. 797); id. 48 (D. C. z8o6); id. 284
(1807); Cf. Bee 97 (D. C. 1799), 116 (0798), 124 (1798), 300, 308 (1804),
313 (1805).
There are many cases in these volumes where the parties must have both
been Americans, either of the same or of different states.
"Cf. Frederick Bausman, 36 Am. L REv. i86.
"On the other hand, the limitation implicit in Hamilton's statement is
connected with the tendency in early cases to exclude from admiralty juris-
diction disputes'between citizens of the same state. Cf. Nicholson v. State, 3
Harris & McHenry. io9 (Md. 1792) ; and cases cited in note 41 ; but see
Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Peters 3a4, 341 (1833) and the longer continuing tend
ency to exclude cases not involving interstate or foreign commerce, e. g., Allen
v. Newberry,, 21 How. 244; McGuire v. Card, 21 How. 249 (1858); but see,
e. g., The Belfast, 7 Wall 625 (1868).
2In England, at least, as late as x539 there was no such concurrency:
2 Select Pleas Admiralty, xliii. See also i Black Book 69, 83, and W. S.
Holdsworth, 2 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 297; De Lovio
v. Bo-t, 2 Gall. 398. 422, 428 (1815) ; Steele v. Thacher, i Ware (2d ed.) 85,
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extent at least in the colonies 28 common law courts had concur-
rent jurisdiction, but there is nothing to show that the framers
intended that in the exercise of this jurisdiction the state courts
might apply whatever law they pleased, at least in the case of the
foreign litigant, who was a defendant in a state court,-perhaps
also in the case of the defendant from another state, or even of
the citizen. Until we know more of the opinion of the framers
and more as to the extent of differences at this time between the
general maritime law and state law as to maritime transactions,
it is improper to assume such an intent on the part of the fram-
ers. And even if there were differences, can we be sure that the
framers who were forming a Federal union intended to per-
petuate them? Such an intent might more reasonably be im-
plied if the framers were confronted with possible differences be-
tween the maritime and the local law of a single political unit
having a single sovereign responsible for both systems. But, as
seems not generally to have been noticed, the situation confront-
ing the framers was a very different one. The union brought
together thirteen different sovereigns, each responsible only for
its own common law, and as to this not at all controlled by the
Federal Government. The framers, because of the multiplicity
of differences likely to exist and because of the fact that the Fed-
eral Governmeti would otherwise have had no control, may
well have intended to resolve them once for all in favor of the
law of the new national government.
Vhatever the framers ray have had in mind, their actual
intent is of less importance than what they were subseqeuntly
believed to have intended and what was done with the words they
placed in the Constitution.
The striking features of the early history of our maritime
law are, first, the geographical extension of jurisdiction, second,
the increased resort to admiralty courts particularly in commer-
89 (1825). The subsequent invasion of the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction by
ihe common law was. of course, largely based on fictitious venues. Cf. De
Lovio v. Boit, 422, 448, 476. It resulted in a return invasion of the common
law by principles of the law merchant including parts of the maritime law:
Holdsworth, 3i5-32o. Chandler v. Grieves, 2 H. B. 6o6n.
: See x Dall. 81 (Pa. x766). Cf. id. 165 (792) ; Ancient Charters, Mass.
App. 7x6; 3 Am. L REv. 672, 673.
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cial cases, necessitating the formulating of rules as to jurisdic-
tion, and third, the recognition of power in the .states to create
maritime liens for supplies, repairs, and materials furnished
to vessels in their home port. With these three subjects I will
deal in turn, so far as they bear one way or the other on the doc-
trine of uniformity.
The first may be dismissed in a few'words. The repudiation
of the English limitation of admiralty jurisdiction to tidewaters
came only after some time,29 but perhaps not much later than
commerce developed on the inland non-tidal waters of the. United
States. As has occurred often in our maritime history, ihe
courts were more concerned with the destruction of limitations
than with the construction or statement of the reasons that moved
them to decide as they did. Indeed we find little more than a
tacit assumption that because commerce on these inland waters
resembles and is connected with sea-borne commerce, the admi-
ralty jurisdiction that exists as to the latter should exist as to the
former. In short, the maritime law followed the merchant and
trader as it had done in the past. A decision that drew an
arbitrary line between two groups of maritime transactions
similar in character would of course have been subversive of
uniformity. On the other hand the actual decisions do not in
themselves indicate any very clear recognition of the theory.
The second feature is more significant bot*h for and against
it. Even earlier than this geographical extension of the domain
of the admiralty, began a series of cases that ultimately set a
rule for determining jurisdiction over maritime contracts. Many
of our early judges believed that, on becoming independent, the
United States took over the English admiralty law with its lim-
ited jurisdiction just as the States took over or continued with
the common law.30 It was, however, quite early established that
"The Genesee Chief, iz How. 443 (i8x) ; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall.
555 (1866).
" Cf. Washington, I., in U. S. v. McGill, 4 Dall. 426 (i8o6) ; Davis, ., in
Netterstrom v. The Hazard. Bee 441, 458 (D. C. z8o9) ; Peters, I., in ,GaTd-
ner v. The New Jersey, i Pet. Adm. Dec. 228, 229 (D. C. i8o6). Cf. Waite,
C. J., in The Harrisburg, zi9 U. S. i99 (1886); Johnson, J., Ramsey v.
Allegra, 12 Wheat. 6xx (z827). There are many early cases to the same ef-
fect.
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this was not so, and that our admiralty jurisdiction at least was
broader than that of England at the time of the Constitution.81
In passing, it might be observed that it is rather difficult
to see why this emancipation from the limitations of English
law did not also mean emancipation from the rule of concurrent
jurisdiction in the common law courts, the growth of which rule
was a result of the same causes that led to the limitations; or at
least why it cannot be argued with much force that since our con-
stitutional grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is a
grant of a broader power than that which England knew at this
time, the Constitution never guaranteed concurrent jurisdiction
to the state courts,-in short, that their right to this concurrency
arises, if at all, only out of a statute of Congress. But however
this may be, it is a fact that the jurisdiction actually exercised
by our admiralty courts in the early days was not much greater
than the jurisdiction of the English admiralty courts as a matter
of law. Cases involving carriage of goods by -sea, marine insur-
ance and even general average were almost invariably brought
in the state courts. Yet these subjects furnished a large, if not
the greater part of the maritime law of other nations, 32 and juris-
diction had been freely exercised over them by some of the Colo-
nial courts. 3 A condition therefore existed, which to some ex-
tent at any rate worked against uniformity, differentiating our
law in practice from that of other nations except England. The
admiralty courts, however, regained, or as some would put it,
acquired jurisdiction in these matters, 34 and the rule for deter-
"Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 44 (1847); The Jerusalem. 2 Gall. 345
(C. C. 1815). Cf. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How.
344 (1848). There are many other cases to same effect. Cf. also as to mean-
ing of term "'maritime," 2- Willoughby, Const. Law, sec. 637; WVatson Const.,
i103; Benedict, Adm. Sth ed., secs. A8 123-126; De Lavio v. BOAt, 2 Gall. 398,
47'.
"An examination of the Ordonnancc of 168z and of the Code de CoM-
merce will make this clear.
6 The Underwriter, 119 Fed. 713, 734 (D. C. 1902); see 3 AM. L. REV.665.
"Drinkwater v. Freight and Cargo of the Spartan, i Ware (2d ed.) 145
(D. C. 1828) may be the first suit in the federal admiralty court directly upon
a contract of transporiation by sea, and De Lovio v. Boit, supra, the first in-
volving a contract of marine insurance.
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mining whether or not a contract fell within the competency of
the admiralty court was finally determined by the Supreme
Court 35 following of course, the magnificent decision of Justice
Story many years before.38 As usually stated the doctrine of
these cases is that the nature of the. contract is the determining
factor and that if the contract may be characterized "as mari-
time" admiralty courts have jurisdiction. But the principal task
of the court in both these cases was to destroy arguments based
on English limitations, and it was all but assumed that the con-
tracts sued on in these cases--contracts of marine insurance-
were truly "maritime." Therefore, and it is a pity, the court was
not called upon to state fully what considerations went to deter-
mine the meaning of this adjective. Nevert~eless we find con-
sciousness of the theory of uniformity in both decisions. In the
Supreme Court Justice Bradley, after adverting to the jealousy
of the admiralty exhibited by the courts of the common law, in a
brief description of admiralty courts and admiralty law, repeats
Lord Mansfield's saying that the admiralty law was not the law
of any particular country but the general law of nations, and
then describes it as a law "embracing, altogether, a system of
regulations embodied and matured by the combined efforts of the
most enlightened commercial nations of the world." He -points
out that the English limitations on jurisdiction stood alone, that
they were not carried over into this country, that the fundamental
inquiry in questions involving jurisdiction over contracts was -the
subject matter which if maritime gave jurisdiction to the admi-
ralty, and then determines that the contract of marine insurance
is maritime because of the nature of its principal incident,-a
guaranty against loss by sea perils,-because in origin it was a
maritime institution, and because in other nations, except Eng-
land, it is so considered.3 7 In short, throughout this decision we
find consciousness of our admiralty law as part of an interna-
tional system and of an effort in determining the scope of its
jurisdiction to integrate our law therewith. Although in De
"Insurance Co. v. Dunham, it Wall. I (1871).
'De Lovio v. Boit, supra, note it.
X VAIL i, at 23-35-
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Lovio v. Boit, Mr. Justice Story was mainly concerned with the
history of the controversy between admiralty and common law,
nevertheless after pointing out that our admiralty jurisdiction
was not so limited as that in England, that the term "maritime"
expands the constitutional grant, and that this term includes
maritime contracts and marine insurance, he says:
"The language of the Constitution will therefore warrant
the most liberal interpretation; and it may not be unfit to hold,
that it had reference to that maritime jurisdiction, which com-
mercial convenience, public policy, -and national rights have con-
tributed to establish, with slight local differences, all over
Europe; that jurisdiction, whici, under the name of consular
courts, first established itself upon the shores of the Mediterra-
nean, and, from the general equity and simplicity of its proceed-
ings, soon commended itself to all maritime states; that juris-
diction in short, which, collecting the wisdom of the civil law,
and combining it with the customs and usages of the sea, pro-
duced the venerable Consolato del Mare, and still continues in its
decisions to regulate the commerce, the intercourse, and the war-
fare of mankind. Of this great system of maritime law, it may
truly be said: 'Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc,
alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et
sempiterna et immortalis, continebit.' [Cic. Frag. de Repub.
lib. 3 (Editid. Bost. 1817, tom. 17, p. 186)]." 3.3
There are, of course, several theories as to the meaning of
the adjectives "admiralty and maritime." The first word is no
doubt more specific than the second and the tendency is to look
upon it as intended to describe some known system or institution.
The word "maritime," however, is not a term of art. In deter-
mining so momentous a matter as the jurisdiction of a court it
seemingly would scarcely be sufficient to use the dictionary mean-
ing of the term, even though it were Johnson's, nearest perhaps
to the time of the Constitution. This adjective should be given a
meaning that will comport with whatever theory the court has as
to the proper basis for the existence of an admiralty and mari-
2 Gall. 398 (U. S. C. C. 1815), at p. 472.
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time system of law differentiated from the common law.A9 When,
therefore, we find Justice Bradley and Justice Story speaking in
the terms of the theory of uniformity, we are justified in believ-
ing that "maritime contracts" meant to them those contracts re-
lating to sea transactions within the scope of their idea of uni:
formity.
The standardizing of the test of jurisdiction in contract
cases seems therefore to comport with the doctrine. The simi-
lar standardizing of the rule in tort cases has very little relation
to it. One who believes that the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court are evil and wishes to trace that evil to its source, need go
no further back than The Plymouth.40  This case, sharply dif-
ferentiating tort from contract, as the history of maritime law.
seemingly never warranted, made'locality, not subject matter, the
basis of jurisdiction in tort cases. Such a test leaves wholly out
of account the nature of the contact involved. Even a rule of
averages cannot justify The Plymouth. Too many torts, mari-
time in nature by whatever reasonable meaning we give that
term, may be excluded, and too many torts, equally non-maritime,
brought in. It was largely as a consequence of the locality test
that the longshoremen and shipyard workers in hosts came into
the admiralty courts with very little consideration whether con-
sistently with the theory of uniformity or any other reasonable
theory they were rightly there or not.
Looking upon these two subjects as one, we find this situa-
tion: in contract cases a test of jurisdiction still vague but con-
"If the phrase "admiralty and maritime" has a definite meaning incon-
sistent with the theory of uniformity, then all discussion of that theory, so
far as jurisdiction is concerned, is closed. Certain authors" show what may be
called an institutional bias. that is maritime, as to which there are in the
civilized world admiralty, that is, particularistic legal, institutions. See Bene-
dict Adm., 5th ed., secs. 38, 39. Many courts have given the word a broader
meaning. That is maritime, which relates to commerce and navigation by
sea. See Hughes Adm_, 2d ed., 18. In general, however, courts and authors
have merely pointed out that the word maritime was incorporated in the Con-
stitution to guard against a narrow interpretation; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall
398, 471 (1i85) ; 2 Willoughby, Const. Law, sec. 637; Watson, Const., iio3.
*The Plymouth, 3 Wall 20 (1865). There have, of course, been many
efforts towards a modification of this rule. Cf. The Blackheath, x95 U.
361 (i9o4); Campbell v. H. Haclfield & Co, 125 Fed. 699 (C. C. A. 19o3);
18 HAiv. L Rav. 2wg; 8 CoL. I. REV. 499.
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sistent with the theory of uniformity,--indeed rather favoring
it than not; in tort cases a test framed with regard to no rational
basis whatever.
The third of the three features in the early development of
our maritime law remains to be considered. Before our admi-
ralty law was fairly on its legs, it was held that no maritime lien
or right to proceed in rem arose where supplies or repairs were
furnished to a vessel in her home port, with a dictum that if her
home port law, so to speak, that is, the state law, gave a lien, such
was a matter of local concern. 41  Some of the opponents of the
doctrine of uniformity have seized upon this dictum and the de-
cisions applying it 42 as showing that the admiralty law itself has
sanctioned non-uniformity. Certainly, admitting this power in
the states, diversity of law at once appears, but that diversity is
of course confined to the field in which the state law operates, and
that field is, generally speaking, local. So long as "home port"
means the port where the owner resides, and not the port of the
vessel's enrollment or registry, the contact involved is between
the owner, a local man by hypothesis, and the supplyman, who
is rarely other than local. 43 True, there is not uniformity of law
as to all persons engaged in "maritime transactions," but there is
uniformity as to that class of transactions where seemingly it is
desirable-those involving interstate and international contacts.
If we once concede that as the operative field of the ideal of
uniformity is not necessarily coterminous with the field of juris-
diction as the latter has been developed,-a concession which, as
I hope to show later, we should be willing to make,-there is
nothing in these cases inconsistent with an ideal of uniformity,
'The General Smith, 4 Wi heat. 438 (181g). See also Peyroux v. Howard,
7 Pet. 324 (1833); The J. E. Rumbell, r48 U. S. 1 (1893). The rule was
evidently based on the practice in the Federal courts: Gardner v. The New
Jersey, i Pet. Adm. Dec. 213 (D. C. i8o6); North v. The Eagle, Bee 78. 7
(D. C. 1796). Cf. Shrewsbury v. The Two Friends, Bee 433 (Adm. Ct., S.
C., 1786); Turnbull v. The Enterprise, Bee .345 (Adm. Ct., Pa, x785). Judge
Peters turned jurisdiction over to the state courts as a matter of discretion to
avoid conflicts: Gardner v. The New Jersey, 228; U. S. v. McGill, 4 Dall. 426
(i8o6).
' See E. T. Fell, 4o Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies 298; Pitney, J., dis-
senting in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 237 (917).
The General Burnside, 3 Fed. 228 (D. C. xM8o).
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that is, uniformity where seemingly it is most desirable. While
the rule above mentioned has not always manifested itself in such
a way as to limit the contacts which the state lien law can regu-
late, nevertheless the weight of opinion, eventually culminating
in a decision of the Supreme Court, held that state lien laws were
not effective as to foreign vessels or vessels from another state."
This discussion has been limited to the question of the power
of states to affect admiralty law by the passage of lien laws for
the benefit of local supply, repair, and materialmen. The larger
subject of the conflict between state and Federal courts as to the
right to proceed in rem, together with such matters as the en-
forcement of local death acts, concurrency of jurisdiction, the
"saving clause," and others, remains for further treatment.
Austin Tappan Wright.
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
"The Chusan, 2 Story 455 (C. C. 1843); The Roanoke, 189 U. S. i85
(1903) ; Cf. also The Kate, 56 Fed. 614 (D. C. 1893). Cf. also the rule that
makes the matter of priorities under these state lien acts a matter of Fed-
eral maritime law: The J. E. Rumbell, i48 U. S. 1 (1893).
